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... the voters of California deeply distrust Sacramento, and it is impossible to
imagine that they would favor an initiative to eliminate school districts and local school
boards. Yet, there are clear signs that the institutions of local governance are crum-
bling.
 Brunner and Sonstelie (2006)
1 Introduction
After years of timid federal K-12 education policy leaving the lions share to state and local gov-
ernments, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) has opened a new era of strong federal
intervention in U.S. schools. At the heart of NCLB is a federally mandated full-edged account-
ability system. Yet NCLB has left intact the fundamental decision-making institution of the school
system: the elected school board. Local elected o¢cials remain in charge of most strategic decisions
and, crucially, of the allocation of the bulk of education dollars. And school board members remain
directly accountable to their local electorates.
The 2001 federal act marks the climax of 30 years of centralization in the school nance system,
sparked by the 1971 Serrano ruling in California. Across the U.S., and especially in California, cen-
tralized school nance (at the state level) has been criticized on the grounds that it impedes local
electoral accountability  i.e. the ability of local elections to act as a disciplining device. Accord-
ing to critics, centralization has transformed school board elections into meaningless disciplining
devices.1 In light of such criticisms, the further centralization in Washington caused by President
George W. Bushs NCLB initiative appears to be at odds with the laws prominent objective of
increased accountability for States, school districts, and schools.2
This paper explores the link between school nance centralization and electoral accountability
at the school board level, both before and after NCLB, in the state with the most centralized
school nance system: California. Although shared expenditure responsibility between levels of
government is an increasingly relevant phenomenon in both developing and developed countries,
exogenous changes from tier-specic expenditure responsibility to shared responsibility are scarce in
practice. Brunner and Sonstelie (2006) argue, however, that centralized school nance in California
provides a rare experiment in scal federalism, permitting an assessment of the accountability
consequences of the growing involvement of a higher tier of government in an area previously under
the primary responsibility of local governments.
The empirical framework of this paper is derived from a theoretical model related to the one
developed in Joanis (2008). In this model, the growing involvement of multiple tiers of government
in the provision of a public good creates a shared accountability problem. With shared responsibil-
ity, electoral accountability can be expected to worsen: Thinking about a reform featuring a move
1See Timar (2006) for a critical discussion in the Californian context.
2U.S. Department of Education (2002).
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away from a situation of complete decentralization (say, at the local level) and towards a growing
involvement of higher tiers of government (say, state and federal governments), the mechanism
highlighted in the theory predicts a loss in voters ability to hold politicians accountable. However,
state and federal programs are often specically designed to improve local accountability  this is
especially true of recent initiatives. The theoretical e¤ect of an increased involvement of higher
tiers of government in the provision of public education on local electoral accountability is therefore
ambiguous and warrants empirical investigation.3
From a methodological standpoint, school board elections have desirable features as a labora-
tory for testing the extent of electoral accountability. A key advantage of school boards is the fact
that they determine the fate of politicians dealing with a single policy function, namely providing
public elementary and secondary education. By contrast, the main problem with assessing the
role of national elections as accountability devices is the complex array of tasks that higher tiers
of government are involved with, not to mention the small sample sizes typically associated with
studying national election outcomes and the many potential confounding factors.4 Hence, local
elections present a promising alternative to national elections for studying electoral accountability
as they typically deal with fewer policy issues, and as a much larger number of them are held every
year  California alone is divided in approximately 1,000 districts.5
More importantly, the institutional environment of Californias school districts provides the type
of variation needed to investigate the e¤ect of centralization on local electoral accountability. The
analysis exploits the heterogenous degree of school nance centralization across school districts
to test whether and, if so, how the extent of school nance centralization a¤ects the electoral
accountability of school board members. The California Elections Data Archive (CEDA) provides
school board election results for the period 1995-2004, allowing the analysis to capture within-
district time variation in the degree of state and federal involvement at the local level, including,
crucially, the variation associated with NCLB after 2001.
Despite widespread skepticism surrounding the role played by local elections in a highly cen-
tralized system such as Californias, results show that the reelection probability of local incumbents
is responsive to di¤erences in dropout rates and pupil-teacher ratios.6 Incumbents also appear less
3This does not rule out the possibility of separately identifying these two opposing e¤ects.
4A large body of literature has studied the prevalence of economic voting at the national level, i.e. the extent
to which voters reward or punish politicians for macroeconomic outcomes observed at the time of an election. See
Nadeau et al. (2002) for a recent contribution. While the correlation between macroeconomic and electoral variables
highlighted by this literature is interesting in its own right, it is quite hard to interpret this correlation as evidence
of electoral accountability.
5The main limitation to the use of local elections data in assessing electoral accountability is the lack of compre-
hensive data. In the U.S., besides Californias CEDA initiative, only South Carolina mandates centralized collection
of school board election results  see Berry and Howell (2007) for a paper using data on the states 85 districts for
the 2000-2004 period. Municipal elections data is equally scarce. To address this limitation, Ferreira and Gyourko
(2009) exploit original data from a survey that they conducted at the municipal level in the US.
6Rincke (2007) nds similar results using Californias Academic Performance Index (API). While Rincke is also
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likely to be reelected when a districts degree of centralization is high, conditional on a large set of
socio-demographic district controls. Fixed e¤ect regression results also suggest that the increased
involvement of the federal government after 2001 has sharpened local electoral accountability. To-
gether, these results do not seem to support the view that local elections are meaningless devices
in a highly centralized local nance system, in addition to highlighting a potentially benecial role
for higher levels of government in fostering local accountability.
The paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, it complements the existing litera-
ture on the e¤ect of school nance centralization by exploring its consequences on local politics.7
Second, this paper contributes to the small but growing literature that specically studies the con-
sequences of No Child Left Behind.8 Third, the analysis also contributes to our understanding
of the political economy consequences of decentralization by studying a single public good (i.e.
education), supplementing a large body of literature on decentralization that typically uses data
on broad categories of spending or on total government spending.9
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simplied version of the theoretical model
developed in Joanis (2008) and discusses its empirical implementation. In Section 3, I discuss
the institutional environment of Californias school districts and place Californias experience in
the context of the broader debate about school nance centralization in the United States. The
data are described in Section 4. Empirical results are presented and discussed in Sections 5 and
6. First, Section 5 focuses on the extent to which voters in school board elections react to good
policy outcomes by reelecting incumbents (and to bad policy outcomes by defeating them), and
on how centralization a¤ects the probability that an incumbent is reelected. Section 6 takes the
investigation of the role played by centralization one step further, exploiting the variation in federal
funding associated with No Child Left Behind. Some concluding remarks are collected in Section
7.
2 Theoretical Framework and Empirical Implementation
In this section, I set up a theoretical framework of voter behaviour in an environment characterized
by the involvement of more than one level of government in public good provision. The model is
an application of the political agency model developed in Joanis (2008), tailored to capture the key
interested in local electoral accountability in Californias school boards, he does not address the role of school nance
centralization  the main focus of the current paper.
7Prominent papers on school nance reform include Card and Payne (2002), Hoxby (2001) and Murray et al.
(1998).
8To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst paper to look at the electoral accountability consequences of No Child
Left Behind. Other accountability dimensions of the federal reform have been studied, among others, by Neal and
Whitmore Schanzenbach (2007), Hastings and Weinstein (2007), Holmes et al. (2006), and Hanushek and Raymond
(2005).
9A number of important papers in this literature are discussed in Joanis (2008).
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electoral accountability aspects of school nance centralization.10 This theoretical model supplies
the basic relationship to be estimated.
2.1 A Simple Model of Shared Electoral Accountability
Consider a model in which the population of a local jurisdiction j  here a school district  derives
utility from a local public good (Oj). In the context of this paper, Oj is best thought of as the
quality of public education delivered by the local education agency (LEA).
2.1.1 Technology and Preferences
The public good, Oj , is the outcome of a combination of public inputs produced by three levels of
government: the LEA (glj), the State (g
s
j ), and the federal government (g
f
j ). Assume the following
technology for Oj :
Oj = G(g
l
j ; g
s
j ; g
f
j ); (1)
where G is a production function which is increasing in the quantity of its three inputs. These
inputs can be interpreted as each politicians e¤ort toward public good provision.
The representative voter in a district derives utility from the public good and from other goods
(denoted by the vectors Xj and Zj). Assume that she has the following linear utility function:
uj = +Oj + Xj + Zj ; (2)
where Xj captures various district characteristics and Zj stands for characteristics of local politi-
cians (beside their e¤ort toward public good provision).
2.1.2 Information, Centralization and Local Elections
Voters reelect the local incumbent if they judge that the expected utility level that they derive from
his contribution to the public good (labeled Eulj) exceeds the (realized) utility level associated with
a random challenger:
Reelect l if Eulj + j  u
l
j ; (3)
10Other theoretical models devoted to the study of this issue include Hoxby (1999), Nechyba (2003) and Borck
(2008). Hoxbys model predicts that decentralized nance can do almost as well as centralized nance. Hence, in
that sense, her model provides little guidance for empirical investigation. Another issue is the absence of a political
process in her model, though she recognizes that ongoing politics are necessary. Both the present work and Borck
(2008) attempt to address this concern by modeling explicitly some dimension of the political process. While I
highlight the informational problems associated with the growing involvement of a second tier of government in the
provision of public education, Borck (2008) focuses on the heterogeneous experiences of di¤erent income groups (with
centralization being preferred by some and decentralization by others). In work that is highly related to both the
theoretical work of Borck and the current empirical application, Nechyba (2003) emphasizes the important role of
mobility across districts, peer e¤ects and private school enrollment on the outcomes of school nance reforms.
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where ulj is a random utility level, iid across districts with cdf F; and j is a district-specic shock.
The probability that voters reelect the local politician in district j (denoted P lj) is thus given by
P lj = Pr
h
ulj  Eu
l
j + j
i
= F
h
Eulj + j
i
: (4)
Voters do not directly observe the quantity of public inputs produced by each level of government.
Assume that voters form their expectation of the utility level associated with the actions of the
local incumbent as follows:
Eulj = + E
h
glj jOj ; Cj
i
+ Xj + Zj ; (5)
where Cj is a districts degree of centralization, dened as the share of higher levels of government
(State and federal) in total spending:
Cj =
gsj + g
f
j
glj + g
s
j + g
f
j
: (6)
Hence, voters must infer the e¤ort exerted by the local incumbent politician (l) based on a retro-
spective observation of Oj and their knowledge of the relative role of the local government in the
production process (Cj). When forming their expectation, assume that voters receive an imperfect
signal about the contribution of the local incumbent. In other words, they seek to di¤erence out
from the observed outcome (Oj) the portion that is not attributable to ls actions, but rather to
state and federal intervention. Accordingly, assume that voters form their expectations according
to the following accountability function, which translates observed policy outcomes (Oj) into votes
for the incumbent politician:
E
h
glj jOj ; Cj
i
= (1  Cj)#Oj ; (7)
where # captures the quality of the signal that voters receive about the level of e¤ort exerted by
their local politician. Equation (7) has the following implications: if Cj = 1; the local politicians
reelection probability does not depend on observed policy outcomes; at the other extreme, if Cj = 0
the voters fully attribute the observed outcomes (#Oj) to the local politician.
Assume further that spending by the state and federal governments can improve the quality
of the signal received by voters about their LEAs performance (for example through mandated
dissemination of information on Oj):
# = #(Cj); (8)
where 0  #(Cj)  1 and #0(Cj)  0: If # = 1; voters perfectly observe Oj and attribute glj =
(1  Cj)Oj to the local politicians. And if # = 0; they do not observe Oj at all. For intermediate
values of #; voters take only part of Oj into consideration when assessing the local politicians
performance.
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Substituting in equation (8), equation (7) can be characterized by its partial and cross-partial
derivatives:
 O =
@E
h
glj jOj ; Cj
i
@Oj
= #(Cj)(1  Cj)  0; (9)
 C =
@E
h
glj jOj ; Cj
i
@Cj
=

#0(Cj)(1  Cj)  #(Cj)

Oj ? 0; and (10)
 OC =
@2E
h
glj jOj ; Cj
i
@Oj@Cj
= #0(Cj)(1  Cj)  #(Cj) ? 0: (11)
When observing a change ofOj in the outcome variable, voters will attribute onlyE
h
glj jOj ; Cj
i
=
 OOj to the local politician. The rst potential role of the degree of centralization in this envi-
ronment is to alter the slope of the accountability function ( O). According to equation (11), the
e¤ect of centralization on  O is ambiguous: On the one hand, centralizations direct e¤ect decreases
 O by reducing the fraction of Oj attributed to the local government (the second term in  OC ,
 #(Cj)); but on the other hand, centralization may improve the quality of the signal received by
voters, increasing  O (the rst term in  OC , #
0(Cj)(1   Cj)). Note that the rst-order e¤ect of
centralization on E
h
glj jOj ; Cj
i
,  C , is ambiguous for the same reasons.
2.2 Empirical Implementation
Equation (4) forms the basis of the empirical strategy pursued in this paper. Substituting in
equation (5), we get:
P lj = F
h
+ E
h
glj jOj ; Cj
i
+ Xj + Zj + j
i
: (12)
Exploiting the properties of E
h
glj jOj ; Cj
i
and linearizing, I will estimate the following equation to
identify  O,  C and  OC :
P lj = F

+  OOj +  CCj +  OCCj Oj + Xj + Zj + j

: (13)
The main parameters of interest for the analysis of this paper are  O,  C and  OC . In what
follows, the measurement convention will be that Oj is a public bad (e.g. a high dropout rate),
that is we will expect an increase in Oj to reduce an incumbents reelection probability. Under
that measurement convention,  ^O will be expected to be negative if local elections are meaningful
accountability devices.  ^C and  ^OC will characterize the e¤ect of centralization of school nance
on incumbents reelection probability. Negative values for both parameters will be indicative that
centralization conveys information to voters about negative characteristics of incumbents, while
positive values will be consistent with centralization weakening local electoral accountability.11
11Note that alternative explanations could rationalize positive or negative values for  ^C and  ^OC : For example,
a high Cj could denote a local politicians strong abilities to secure state and federal funds for his LEA, consistent
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To estimate equation (13), additional assumptions will be required about the distributions of
j and u
l
j : If u
l
j is assumed to follow a uniform distribution on the [0; 1] interval (which implies a
normalization to unity of the maximal utility associated with a challenger) and if j is normally
distributed, the parameters in equation (13) can be estimated by means of the following linear
probability model:12
P ljt = +  OOjt +  CCjt +  OCCjt Ojt + Xjt + Zjt + jt: (14)
In what follows, I estimate various empirical specications of equation (14) using detailed data
at the school district level in California. The next section provides some institutional background
on school nance reform in the U.S., highlighting the specicity of the Californian experience.
3 School Finance in California: A Primer
The provision of elementary and secondary (K-12) public education in California falls under the
responsibility of school districts. School boards are responsible for a variety of scal, administrative
and academic matters, including adopting the districts budget, collective bargaining and hiring
the superintendent. As Moe (2006) puts it, school boards in the United States are strong: They
build schools, select textbooks, design curricula, recruit teachers, award diplomas, set rules for
discipline, and oversee a vast array of operations, plans, and policies that shape the education
experiences of most American children.
While the provision of public education in the State is under the primary responsibility of
school districts, both the State and to a lesser extent the federal government play an important
role through a series of transfer programs and various legislative requirements. The involvement of
the State government in California is especially strong, with California having the most centralized
school nance system in the United States. Federal involvement has also become more prominent
in recent years following the inception of No Child Left Behind in 2001.
3.1 State Programs in California
Californias centralized school nance system is the result of a series of court decisions starting with
the 1971 Serrano ruling, by which the historical school nance system  dominated by local taxes
and local accountability mechanisms  was deemed unconstitutional and was overturned.
Serrano led to a sharp increase in the share of district revenues coming from the State. Conse-
quently, transfers to school boards in California now amount to a large number of state and federal
with a positive  ^C . However, a high Cj could also be associated with a required intervention by higher levels of
government to punish shirking by the local politicians, consistent with a negative  ^C :
12 If ulj is standard normal, equation (13) can also be estimated using a Probit regression.
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programs, including both general-purpose transfers (mostly equalization) and a long list of cate-
gorical funds. The latter are the result of a complex mix of programs and historical entitlements,
often unrelated to district needs.
The underlying complexity of Californias transfer system is well illustrated by the case of one
of the States main categorical programs: the Economic Impact Aid (EIA). The EIA is a categorical
program whose objective is to support additional programs and services for English learners (EL)
and compensatory education services for educationally disadvantaged students (LAO, 2004). All
districts can apply for these funds. This is a signicant program: it awarded $973,388,000 to a
total of 974 districts in 2006-2007.13 Before 2006, EIA was determined by two main formulae. The
primary formula used a complex multistep process based on needs and poverty. A districts
needs were measured by its concentration of EL, poor, and transient students.14 The secondary
formula distributed funds to districts whose primary funding allocations would not be su¢cient
to serve a reasonable portion of the population of pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds (LAO,
2004).15
In February 2004, the California Legislative Analysts O¢ce (LAO) released the following state-
ment about EIA in its analysis of the 2004-05 budget bill:
We nd that the EIA funding formula is outdated and results in district allocations
that appear arbitrary and unpredictable. We recommend the Legislature simplify the
EIA formula so that district allocations are predictable and meet local needs for serving
both poor and English learner students.
The empirical analysis of Section 5 will exploit such essentially exogenous variation across
districts to identify the e¤ect of centralization on electoral outcomes.16
3.2 California in Perspective: State Programs in Other States
The Serrano ruling opened the way to similar school nance reforms in many other states. Be-
tween 1971 and 1992, the historical school nance systems were overturned in 12 states (see Card
and Payne, 2002). Card and Paynes numbers show that a key consequence of the reforms that
followed these rulings has been, as expected, an increase in the state governments contribution to
13These gures are from the California Department of Education.
14The formula also used two measures of poverty: the enrollment of students from families receiving California
Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids (CalWORKs) grants and poverty data from the 1990 Census.
15The secondary formula has two elements. (1) Per-Pupil Grant: Districts that would receive a relatively small
allocation through the primary formula receive funding based solely on the number of CalWORKs and EL students.
In 2003-04, approximately 600 school districts received $219 for each student in the two target groups. (2) Minimum
District Grant: Districts with very low numbers of EL pupils and pupils from families receiving CalWORKs receive
a minimum grant. In 2003-04, approximately 175 school districts received minimum grants.
16 In particular, see Section 5.4 for a discussion of identication issues.
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expenditures on public education. In these 12 states, the share of the state government increased
from 44.5% in 1977 to 56.7% in 1992, a 12.2 percentage point increase.17 In contrast, very limited
action can be observed in the other states. For instance, in the 21 states without a court decision
in 1992, the states involvement increased by a mere 1.4 percentage point on average, and it even
decreased by 0.6 percentage point in the 15 states in which school nance systems were judged
constitutional. Despite a slightly lower share of the state government in states with school nance
systems judged unconstitutional (44.5% vs. 46.2% in states with constitutional systems and 46.3%
in states with no ruling), the three categories of states displayed remarkably similar degrees of
school nance centralization in 1977.
Interestingly, the states with court-ordered reform did not experience higher growth of total
per-student expenditure. In fact, the growth of spending was 3 percentage points lower in states
with court-ordered reforms than in states with court decisions upholding preexisting school nance
systems. Thus, in aggregate, the growing involvement of state governments did not increase ag-
gregate support for public education in these states. This result is arguably driven to a signicant
extent by California, which experienced a large and puzzling decline in education spending relative
to other states (Brunner and Sonstelie, 2006). This puzzle is suggestive of local accountability
problems associated with centralized school nance,18 and warrants empirical investigation of the
accountability consequences of school nance centralization.
3.3 Federal Programs and No Child Left Behind
The recent years have been marked by a signicant increase in the involvement of the federal
government in education policy and school nance through the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
(NCLB). A broad initiative, the objectives of the Act included:19
 Increased accountability for states, school districts, and schools;
 Greater school choice, especially in the presence of low-performing schools;
 More exibility for states and LEAs in the use of Federal education dollars; and
 A stronger emphasis on reading, especially for the youngest children.
According to the U.S. Department of Education (2002), NCLB aimed to increase accountability
in the following sense:
17Those ratios are computed from enrollment-weighted averages provided by Card and Payne (2002).
18One potential explanation is that, knowing that they cant hold their school boards accountable as tightly as
before, voters are less inclined to agree to state money being sent to (ine¢cient, unaccountable) school boards.
Instead, they may be expected to favour other categories of public spending (consistent with California spending
more than average in other spending categories).
19U.S. Department of Education (2002).
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The NCLB Act will strengthen Title I accountability by requiring States to imple-
ment statewide accountability systems covering all public schools and students. These
systems must be based on challenging State standards in reading and mathematics,
annual testing for all students in grades 3-8, and annual statewide progress objectives
ensuring that all groups of students reach prociency within 12 years. Assessment
results and State progress objectives must be broken out by poverty, race, ethnicity,
disability, and limited English prociency to ensure that no group is left behind. School
districts and schools that fail to make adequate yearly progress (AYP) toward statewide
prociency goals will, over time, be subject to improvement, corrective action, and re-
structuring measures aimed at getting them back on course to meet State standards.
Schools that meet or exceed AYP objectives or close achievement gaps will be eligible
for State Academic Achievement Awards.
The next section describes the data used in this paper to investigate the e¤ect of centralization
on local electoral accountability.
4 Data and Variables
Four main data sources will be used in the analysis: the California Elections Data Archive (CEDA),
the Census of Governments, the California Department of Education, and the 2000 Census. In what
follows, I describe these data sources, discuss the variables constructed from these data, and provide
summary statistics. The unit of analysis is the school district (j), and the data cover the 1995-2004
decade.
In school year 2004-05, there were a total of 979 school districts in California: 562 elementary
(or primary) school districts, 88 secondary (or high) school districts and 326 unied districts
(overseeing both primary and high schools). Maps 1 to 4 (located at the end of the paper) depict
the geography of Californias public school system.20 Map 1 shows the location of all public schools
in the State, highlighting the concentration of Californias population in the San Francisco Bay and
Los Angeles areas. Maps 2 to 4 respectively locate each of Californias unied districts (Map 2),
elementary districts (Map 3) and secondary districts (Map 4), featuring their total population.
4.1 Elections
Every school district is governed by an elected school board, generally composed of three, ve or
seven members. Typically, every two years a fraction of the board must earn reelection in non-
partisan, rst-past-the-post elections.21 In collaboration with the State government, the Institute
20The maps were generated using the School District Demographics System, which provides special tabulations of
the 2000 US Census at the school district level.
21 In this paper, I do not consider bond elections, which are also held on a regular basis by school districts.
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for Social Research and the Center for California Studies systematically collect all local election
results in California. For my purposes, the crucial feature of CEDA is that data on school district
elections are readily available starting in 1995.22
To isolate the role of elections in holding incumbents accountable, the analysis of this paper is
based on the subsample of electoral races in which the incumbent seeks reelection. Three electoral
variables are constructed from these data: the percentage of incumbents reelected in year t and
district j (P ljt), incumbents average vote share, and the average number of candidates running.
The latter two variables form the Zjt vector.23 Some districts are subdivided in election wards
while others elect at-large board members. In both cases, since the analysis is conducted at the
district level, these three variables are dened as district averages.
Summary statistics for the election variables are displayed in Table 1. The dataset is composed of
2,507 district/year observations, with a yearly average of 251 districts holding at least one election
in which at least one incumbent ran. The annual count is higher in even years. School board
elections are most often held in conjunction with other political races and even years correspond
to statewide election years  for example, elections held in 1998 and 2002 were held together with
gubernatorial elections. Odd years tend to be reserved for local races alone.24
On average, 77.8% of incumbents were reelected during the period covered by CEDA. The
typical incumbent wins with 30.0% of the popular vote and is involved in a 4.6-candidate race.
4.2 Public Finance
The local elections data is merged with detailed public nance data at the school district level.
These data are compiled yearly by the Census Bureau in the Census of Governments.25 The key
public nance variable of interest is the share of funding coming from the state and/or federal
governments (denoted by Cjt).
Table 2 presents summary statistics on this variable for all districts in California. The average
state share over the 1995-2004 period was 54.9%, more than 7 times higher than the average federal
share (7.2%). The state share peaked in 2001 at 57.2% and declined sharply in the three years
that followed. Mirroring the decline in the state share, the federal share increased steadily in the
post-NCLB period (2002-2004).
22These data are available from the Institute for Social Research. CEDA is housed by California State University,
Sacramento.
23An unfortunate limitation of the California elections data is the absence of turnout data. Moe (2006) qualies
turnout in the 1997 and 1999 school board elections in nine districts located in Los Angeles and Orange counties
as downright abysmal. He estimates a 9-percent median turnout of registered voters. Turnout is higher in bond
elections and for subgroups of the population with a direct stake in educational outcomes (for example, teachers or
parents).
24Turnout tends to be lower in odd years  see Moe (2006). Note that year xed e¤ects will be included in all
empirical specications.
25The data are available from the U.S. Census Bureau.
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Figure 1: Histogram of the share of revenues from state and federal governments, 2004
Californian school districts vary widely with respect to the involvement of higher tiers of gov-
ernment, as is evident from Figure 1. At the far left of the histogram are located a small number
of wealthy districts that do not receive any state funding, the Basic Aid Districts. These districts
rely solely on property taxes to fund public education. As we move to the right of the gure,
districts are less wealthy and rely more heavily on state and federal transfers, with a large number
of districts receiving more than half of their budget in transfers.
4.3 Policy Outcomes
The third source of data covers educational outcomes. Every year, the California Department
of Education releases data on the activities conducted by the States school districts.26 In what
follows, I use two performance measures as policy outcomes at the district level (Ojt): the high
school dropout rate and the pupil-teacher ratio (see Table 2 for summary statistics). As previously
mentioned, the measurement convention is that an increase in Ojt corresponds to a worsening in
performance.
A key advantage of these two performance measures is their availability for the entire period
covered by the elections data, and in particular for both the pre- and post-NCLB periods.27 Another
26These data are made available through the California Basic Educational Data System (CBEDS), which supplies
time-consistent data for the period covered by CEDA. CBEDS is based on annual reports by school districts to the
California Department of Education.
27Unfortunately, CBEDS does not include test scores data. While test scores are available for some years from
other sources, serious time-consistency issues limit their usefulness for the purpose of this paper.
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advantage of these measures is that they supply information about two stages of the educational
production process: while dropout rates are best thought of as an output of the production function,
the pupil-teacher ratio is clearly an input in this process. Thus, the latter is more directly related
to the allocation of resources by school boards than the former. Nevertheless, both the dropout
rate and the pupil-teacher ratio are ultimately outcomes of government action, especially of school
board performance, in the sense adopted in the theoretical discussion of Section 2. And crucially,
information on both policy outcomes are publicly available, and can therefore be used by voters.
The average annual dropout rate in the State between 1995 and 2004 was 2.44%, with higher
gures observed at the beginning and at the end of the period.28 It is important to note that the
dropout rate pertains to districts with high schools only (high school and unied districts), while
the pupil-teacher ratio is available for all districts. A typical teacher had 20.17 pupils to supervise
during the period of interest, with the highest ratio being observed at the beginning of the period,
in 1995. Ten years later, the pupil-teacher ratio had declined by more than three students, a result
of statewide e¤orts to reduce class size in the 1990s. It is worth noting that both outcomes appear
to worsen in the post-NCLB period  Section 6 will focus on the e¤ects of NCLB.
Additional variables constructed from the States data are a dummy variable for primary school
districts, a dummy for high school districts, the total yearly enrollment in the district, and the
number of schools in the district. These form the Xjt vector, together with a series of socio-
demographic characteristics extracted from the 2000 Census.
4.4 Socio-Demographic Characteristics
Finally, a broad set of socio-demographic controls are included in the Xjt vector. The variables
constructed from the 2000 Census and included in the analysis are: the median family income, the
age distribution, the share of immigrants, the populations educational attainments, the quality of
spoken English, the share of households with children, the median rent, the median house value,
the share of households renting, a poverty count, the racial composition, rent as a percentage of
income, the total population, the urban population, and the median e¤ective property tax rate.29
In line with the heterogeneity in the degree of centralization across districts depicted in Figure
1, districts vary widely according to their socio-demographics. For example, see maps 5 and 6
for plots highlighting district heterogeneity in racial composition (Map 5) and median house value
(Map 6).
28The California Department of Education does not release dropout data for 1999.
29The inclusion of variables which proxy for the tax bill faced by households will allow the analysis to focus on the
benet side (policy outcomes) of the cost-benet analysis performed by voters.
14
5 Reelection Probability, Educational Outcomes and Centraliza-
tion
The regression results presented in this section provide an initial assessment of the impact of state
and federal transfers on the reelection probability of school board members. The empirical strategy
involves estimating a linear probability model based on equation (14) derived in Section 2:30
P ljt = +  OOjt +  CCjt + Xjt + Zjt +Yt +Dj + jt; (15)
where Yt is a vector of year e¤ects, and Dj is a vector of district xed e¤ects.31
This section will, in turn, consider results from regressions where Ojt is measured by the change
in a districts dropout rate (results in Table 3) and by the change in a districts pupil-teacher ratio
(results in Table 4). Note that all regressions in this section include the level of Ojt as a control,
and additional control variables to capture potential di¤erences in voting behaviour between the
di¤erent types of districts (unied, primary and high school districts).
Three sets of results are reported in tables 3 and 4. First, data on the full sample of districts
are used (specications (1) and (2)). Then, the sample is split into two groups based on whether
districts experienced a decrease in the dropout rate (the positive outcome specications (3) and
(4)) or an increase (the negative outcome specications (5) and (6))  these results pertaining
to the asymmetry between rewarding and punishing incumbents are discussed below in Subsection
5.3. For each of these three sets of results, two specications are estimated: In specications (1),
(3) and (5), a large set of (time-invariant) census variables is included,32 while in specications (2),
(4) and (6) district xed e¤ects are included.
5.1 High School Dropout Rate Regressions
Table 3 collects the estimation results with Ojt measured as the year-to-year change in the dropout
rate. Because the dropout rate is irrelevant for primary schools, these regressions are estimated on
a subset of districts including only high school and unied districts.
The rst striking result of Table 3 is that school board elections do not appear to be meaningless
as local accountability instruments, contrary to the critical view reported in the introduction of
this paper: an increase in the dropout rate is associated with a lower reelection probability. The
30 I also estimated Probit models, with similar results (available upon request).
31Equation (15) di¤ers from equation (14) in that it does not include the slope e¤ect of centralization on reelection
probability ( OC). Of course, nothing precludes the inclusion of the slope parameter in the regressions conducted
in this section. In unreported regression results corresponding to the ones discussed in this section (available upon
request),  OC is never signicant. These results indicate no statistically signicant di¤erence in how voters react to
observed policy outcomes in centralized vs. centralized districts. See Section 6 for results including the interaction
e¤ect.
32 In these specications, standard errors are adjusted for clustering within districts.
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coe¢cient is signicant at the 5% condence level when xed e¤ects are included (Specication
(2)). The level of the dropout rate is, by itself, not signicant.
Unsurprisingly, the electoral controls (incumbent vote share and number of candidates) have
strong explanatory power. Reelection probability is higher for dominant incumbents, those winning
the election with a higher share of the popular vote. The number of candidates is also positively
related to reelection probability, consistent with a divided opposition reinforcing the incumbents
position.
School politics also appear to di¤er in systematic ways across types of district. Reelection
probability tends to be lower in high school districts, as opposed to unied districts, according to
the xed e¤ects results. This may simply denote a stronger incumbency advantage for elementary
schools  see the results for primary school districts in the next subsection.33 District size is
also related to electoral outcomes: districts with a larger number of schools tend to display lower
reelection rates, but student enrollment does not have a signicant e¤ect.
Finally, key parameters of interest are the e¤ects of centralization at the state and federal levels
on reelection probabilities. According to Specication (1), centralization at the federal level seems
to explain some of the variation in incumbents reelection probabilities. The federal share variable
displays a negative coe¢cient, indicating that the slope of the accountability function (equation (7)
in Section 2) with respect to centralization,  C , is negative for federal funds. This is an indication
that districts where the federal governments presence is strong tend to defeat their local incumbents
at a higher rate. Strong federal presence may reect otherwise unobserved district characteristics
since the coe¢cient on the federal share is not signicant in the xed e¤ect regression (Specication
(2))  see Subsection 5.4 below for a discussion of some related identication issues. Note also that
the state share variable is signicant in neither specication.
5.2 Pupil-Teacher Ratio Regressions (All Districts)
A relatively similar picture emerges when the change in pupil-teacher ratios is used as the outcome
measure. Table 4 displays those results, which now pertain to all three types of districts.
The coe¢cient on the change in pupil-teacher ratio is negative and signicant in Specication
(1). While the coe¢cient is also negative in Specication (2), it is not statistically signicant.34
Again, when signicant, the centralization coe¢cients are negative. According to Specication (2),
districts in which a high proportion of revenues coming from the state government tend to reelect
their incumbents at a lower rate, controlling for district xed e¤ects.35
Two additional results from these specications are noteworthy. First, there is evidence of a
33Note, however, that the sign on the high school dummy is reversed in Specication (1), when xed e¤ects are not
included.
34See Subsection 5.4 below for some remarks on identication with xed e¤ects in the context of this application.
35Note that the discrepancy between this result and the result in Table 3 can be explained by the fact that
elementary school districts are now included in the sample.
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stronger incumbency advantage in primary school districts, captured by the positive coe¢cient
on the primary school district dummy (signicant at the 1% condence level in Specication (1)).
Second, student enrollment is positively related to reelection probability (signicant in Specication
(2)), contrary to the other measure of district size (number of schools).
5.3 Punishing vs. Rewarding
Together, the results presented so far are suggestive that school board elections are playing some
role as accountability devices: reelection probability tends to be negatively related to the occurrence
of bad educational outcomes. Are the above results evidence that voters punish politicians for bad
outcomes, that they reward them for good outcomes, or both? To explore the potential asymmetry
between the punishing and the rewarding functions of school board elections, tables 3 and 4 display
results for the subsample of observations for which the year-to-year variation in the outcome measure
is positive (specications (3) and (4)), and negative (specications (5) and (6)).
Looking rst at the results from dropout rate regressions (Table 3), there is some evidence
that voters reward politicians for positive outcomes  the coe¢cient on the change in dropout
rates is negative and signicant in Specication (3). However, there is no signicant evidence that
politicians were punished for an increasing dropout rate in the negative outcomes specications.36
It is interesting to note that the negative e¤ect of the federal share variable found in Specication
(1) appears to be especially present in the positive outcomes sample.
With the larger sample size due to the inclusion of primary school districts, the coe¢cients from
pupil-teacher ratio regressions are more precisely estimated (see Table 4). These results display
evidence of both rewarding and punishing behaviour. The latter is especially clear in the results,
including in the xed e¤ects results of Specication (6). The negative e¤ect of the state share
variable found in Specication (2) appears to be driven by the negative outcomes sample.
In the remainder of this section, I discuss the identication issues underlying the robustness of
the above results.
5.4 Remarks on Identication and the Peculiarities of Californias Transfer Sys-
tem
The main challenge in estimating equations (14) or (15) comes from the fact that the extent to
which a district relies on the state and the federal governments to fund its public schools (Cjt)
is endogenous. In an ideal experiment, each district would be randomly allocated to one of two
(or more) groups, one in which no funding would be received from higher tiers of government
(the control group) and the other in which some funding would be provided by the state and
federal governments (the treatment group). Alternatively, one could envision two or more groups
36The relatively small sample size for the negative outcomes specications must be acknowledged.
17
with di¤erent degrees of state/federal involvement. However, the main e¤ect of the school nance
reforms enacted since the 1970s has been to boost state funding to poorer districts, increasing their
aggregate nancial resources and improving students outcomes.37 Thus, districts with a more
centralized funding structure tend to di¤er in systematic ways from districts with a less centralized
funding structure (e.g. Basic Aid Districts), the former typically being the more disadvantaged
districts.
In this section, the identication strategy has involved the inclusion of a comprehensive set
of socio-demographic district-level controls. These controls are constructed from the 2000 Census
and, as a consequence, are treated as xed over the period covered by the elections data. The
e¤ect of centralization at the state and federal levels have thus been identied by the variation
in centralization that cannot be explained by di¤erences in socio-demographic characteristics of
districts.
While there are obvious caveats applying to this simple strategy, some of which are addressed
by the empirical strategy pursued in the next section, it is reasonable to assert that the variation
in the centralization variable is relatively exogenous once socio-demographic di¤erences among
districts are controlled for. The rationale for this identication strategy is related to the fact that
Californias school nance system is highly complex, with intergovernmental transfers being the
result of a combination of a variety of state and federal programs  see Section 3 for a detailed
discussion.
Identication of the e¤ect of centralization on reelection probability in the above results has
therefore relied on di¤erences between otherwise similar districts that are treated di¤erently by
state and federal transfer programs. The inclusion of district xed e¤ects has also allowed for
identication of these e¤ects from within-district variation. The main drawbacks of the inclusion of
xed e¤ects are a reduction in the number of available control variables, and the limited variation
in electoral variables due to the small number of electoral cycles covered by the data. Despite
these limitations, Section 6 exploits within-district variation associated with a major reform in the
federal governments transfers to school districts.
6 No Child Left Behind and Electoral Accountability
This section focuses more specically on the federal share variable, taking advantage of the sharp
increase in the federal governments role associated with No Child Left Behind (NCLB) after 2001.
NCLB represents a rare quasi-experiment in scal federalism, with the federal government signi-
cantly increasing its role in both LEAs nances and accountability. While one of the consequences
of NCLBs accountability requirements is to limit local politicians leeway  thus restricting the
scope for e¤ective local electoral accountability  the federal initiative has led to the implementa-
37See Card and Payne (2002).
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Figure 2: Average share of federal spending by district
tion of a visible and uniform accountability system which puts the spotlight on local educational
outcomes  the output of this accountability system now serves as a key input in school board
elections.
This section explores the consequences of NCLB not on educational outcomes themselves but
on local political outcomes in California. Has NCLB reinforced the trend toward a marginalisation
of local governance in the education system or, on the contrary, did NCLB boost local electoral
accountability by improving voters information and choice sets?
6.1 Identication Strategy
As shown in Figure 2, the share of federal transfers in school districts total revenues has been on
the rise since 2001, following a period of remarkable stability. This sudden increase corresponds
to the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act by the federal government in 2001. Exploiting
this variation, the strategy pursued in this section is to identify the e¤ect of centralization out of
within-district di¤erences in centralization, before and after 2001.
I estimate the following version of equation (14), which includes interaction terms with a post
No Child Left Behind (NCLBt) dummy:38
P ljt = + 1Cjt Ojt NCLBt + 2Ojt NCLBt + 3Cjt Ojt (16)
+4Cjt NCLBt + 5Ojt + 6NCLBt + 7Cjt + Xjt + Zjt +Yt +Dj + jt;
where Cjt is the federal share variable and Xjt now includes the state share. In this specication,
both the own e¤ect of centralization and the interaction between centralization and outcomes are
38The NCLB dummy is equal to one in 2002, 2003 and 2004.
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allowed to change in the pre- and post-NCLB periods, as well as the e¤ect of educational outcomes
on reelection probability. The main coe¢cients of interest are 1; 2 and 4: they capture the e¤ect
of the No Child Left Behind on local electoral accountability.
6.2 Results
Table 5 presents estimation results for this empirical strategy, alternatively measuring Ojt as the
dropout rate  Specication (1)  and the pupil-teacher ratio.39 Two specications are provided
for the latter: Specications (2) uses the same sample as Specication (1), i.e. excluding primary
school districts, and Specication (3) uses the whole sample.
6.2.1 High School Dropout Rate
In the dropout rate regression, the e¤ect of NCLB on the interaction of outcomes and centralization
(^1) is signicant, displaying a negative sign. The negative sign reveals that in the post-reform
period centralization has tended to reinforce the link between higher dropout rates and lower
reelection probabilities. In other words, this result suggests that NCLB has increased the e¤ect of
centralization on voters reactivity to adverse educational outcomes, captured by the cross-partial
derivative ( OC) of the accountability function, equation (7). However, this e¤ect is somewhat
dampened by the positive coe¢cient (signicant at the 10% condence level) on the outcome
variable in the post-NCLB period (^2).
The strongly signicant negative coe¢cient on the NCLB dummy itself is also noteworthy,
suggesting that NCLB could be associated with an overall reduction in the incumbency advantage
of school board members. Consistent with the results of the previous section, the vote share and
number of candidates variables are strongly signicant.
6.2.2 Pupil-Teacher Ratio
While the triple interaction term (^1) is not signicant in Specication (2), which uses the same
sample of high school and unied districts as in Specication (1) but the pupil-teacher ratio to
measure outcomes, both the direct e¤ects of educational outcomes (^2) and centralization (^4) on
reelection probabilities are signicantly di¤erent before and after 2001. These two coe¢cients draw
a picture of the e¤ect of NCLB similar to the one that emerges from the dropout rate specication:
In the post-reform period, the pupil-teacher ratio is more negatively correlated with reelection
probability than before (as revealed by a negative ^2), and the federal share is also more negatively
correlated with the dependent variable (negative ^4).40 Finally, note that according to the results
39 In this section, the outcome variables are measured in levels. Note however that with district xed e¤ects included
identication comes from within-district changes over time in the variables.
40Note that these negative coe¢cients are compensated to some extent by the positive estimated direct e¤ect of
the NCLB dummy.
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for Specication (3) these e¤ects do not seem to be present in primary school districts.
Overall, the results of this section suggest that NCLB is a¤ecting local democracy in Califor-
nias high school and unied districts. Interestingly, these exploratory results seem to indicate
an improvement in local electoral accountability associated with the increased federal intervention
characterizing the post-2001 period.
7 Conclusion
The role of the ballot box as a discipline on the providers of public goods has been an issue of
longstanding interest in public economics. One requirement for the ballot box to exert an inuence
is that voters should be responsive to the performance of incumbents. As a consequence, the
ability of voters to hold politicians accountable depends crucially on the information available to
them when casting their ballot. While the extent to which voters have su¢cient information to
link outcomes to the politician who is responsible for them is unobservable, it is likely to vary with
features of the institutional environment. And here, of primary importance is the number of levels
of government being involved.
This paper has provided an empirical exploration of the e¤ects of school nance centralization
on local electoral accountability. To identify the e¤ect of policy outcomes and centralization on
the reelection probabilities of school board members, it exploited both between-district and within-
district time variation associated with the peculiarities of state and federal transfer programs to
school districts in California. In particular, the analysis covered both the pre-NCLB and post-NCLB
periods.
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. First, somewhat surprisingly and
contrary to what critics of centralized school nance often argue, some electoral accountability
is apparent in Californias public school boards despite the systems highly centralized nature.
Second, an incumbents reelection probability tends to be lower in highly centralized districts  a
given policy outcome will deliver a lower reelection probability. This can be seen as a parallel shift
down in the reward scheme of incumbents. And third, the increased involvement of the federal
government after 2001 appears to have sharpened local electoral accountability.
The analysis has caveats. For example, both policy and political outcomes are measured at the
district level, thus aggregating potentially diverging trends at the school level. Indeed, some schools
in a district may be performing well while others are trailing. Also, outcomes are measured annually
while it could be more appropriate in some instances to average them over electoral cycles. Future
work should be conducted to assess the robustness of the results, chiey by analysing a broader set of
policy outcomes in California. However, the crucial need for more comprehensive datasets on local
electoral outcomes must also be addressed in order to replicate the analysis in other jurisdictions
with di¤erent institutional features.
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Map 1. Public schools and counties, 2000 census
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Map 2. Total district population, unified districts, 2000 census
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Map 3. Total district population, elementary districts, 2000 census
31
Legend Map Details
State: California
School District: Secondary
Demographic Option:Total Population
Map Image
Map 4. Total district population, secondary districts, 2000 census
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Map 5. Non-white population, unified districts, 2000 census
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Map 6. Median house value (all owner-occupied units), unified districts, 2000 census
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